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We  built  a  general  equilibrium  endogenous  growth  model  in  which  final  goods  are 
produced  either  in  the  relatively  skilled-labour  intensive  exports  sector  or  in  the 
relatively unskilled-labour intensive domestic sector. We show that, by affecting the 
technological-knowledge bias, subsidies explain the simultaneous rise in the exports 
sector,  the  skill  wage  premium  and  the  economic  growth  rate.  Then,  we  use  a 
Portuguese  longitudinal  database  (1996-2003)  and  implement  a  propensity  score 
matching  approach  to  shed  light  upon  the  causal  nexus  between  production-related 
subsidies and exports. Our empirical results seem to prove the theoretical predictions: 
subsides generate the rise in the wage premium of exporters and the increase in the 
relative size of export sector, even if no impact of subsidies is found in the capacity of 
enhancing new exporters. 
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1. Introduction 
Exports are crucial for the economic growth of most countries and it is well known that 
firms must overcome several difficulties and costs in order to be able to export. Some 
recent theoretical models (e.g., Melitz 2003; Chaney 2008) and some empirical studies 
(e.g.,  Wagner  2007)  found  entry  sunk  costs  of  exporting  as  decisive.  Meanwhile, 
governments have designed several export promotion policies in order to delay with such 
costs  and  difficulties,  even  if  direct  export  subsidization  is  forbidden  by  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules. 
Theoretically, an export subsidy can be either specific or ad valorem payment to 
firms  that  ship  goods  abroad.  Export  subsidies  could  increase  exports  as  they  help  to 
support  some  of  the  exporting  costs,  thus  rising  prices  in  the  exporting  country  and 
inducing more sales and earnings for exporters. However, domestic consumers and the 
government could lose, and the net welfare may well be a loss as the consequence of the 
sum of the distortions in consumption, production and in terms of trade. Export subsidies 
also present some dangers when its allocation relies on subjective mechanisms based on 
arbitrary  decisions,  in  which  case  the  competition  among  firms  to  obtain  them  may 
generate negative effects (e.g., Mitra 2000). 
Nevertheless,  general  production-related  subsidies  may  play  a  relevant  role  in 
promoting exports, without violating WTO rules. There is however little evidence that 
government  promotional  policies  for  exporting  are  effective  in  removing  or  at  least 
reducing such difficulties for exports (e.g., Gorg et al. 2008; Girma et al. 2009a, b). The 
lack of evidence may be caused by different institutional arrangements (both formal and 
informal,  designed  to  help  reduce  the  sunk  costs  of  exporting),  making  it  difficult  to 
distinguish which mechanisms are effective in promoting exports and which are not.   2
International  trade  literature  has  given  little  attention  to  the  role  of  endogenous 
technological knowledge (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). Hence, we start the paper 
by developing a general equilibrium endogenous R&D growth model where, in line with 
Rodrik (2006),
4 final goods are produced either in the relatively skilled-labour intensive 
exports sector or in the relatively unskilled-labour intensive domestic sector. Each final good 
uses labour and quality-adjusted intermediate goods. Building on Acemoglu (2009, Ch. 15) 
scale-dependent horizontal R&D model, we remove scale effects, following the dominant 
literature  on  scale  effects  since  Jones  (1995),  and  we  introduce  vertical  R&D  (e.g., 
Acemoglu 2009, Ch. 14). 
Proposals  to  promote  exports  include  R&D  funding.  For  example,  Girma  et  al. 
(2009b) observe that more than half of Chinese subsidies are allocated to innovation and 
technology promotion, which reveal that: (i) innovation activities are focused on high-tech 
firms;  (ii)  selects  targets  for  subsidizing  are  based  on  firm  features  correlated  with 
exporting. In our model, due to the relationship between intermediate-goods production 
and R&D, R&D directed to improve “exporter” intermediate goods can be encouraged by 
either a direct subsidy or by a subsidy for the production of intermediate goods. 
In our (empirically plausible) context where there is complementarity between inputs 
and  substitutability  between  sectors,  numerical  calculations  describing  dynamic 
equilibrium towards a stable and unique steady state show that subsidies under the price-
channel mechanism affect the technological-knowledge bias. This bias, in turn, affects in a 
positive way: (i) the exports sector; (ii) the relative demand for relatively skilled labour and 
thus the skill-premium – in line with the path seen in developed and developing countries, 
since the 1980s (e.g., Acemoglu 2009, Ch. 15); (iii) the growth rate (e.g., Acemoglu 2009, 
Part IV). 
                                                 
4 These authors use the China to show that, in each country, skilled labor is affected to the exporter sector.   3
Following  our  theoretical  model  and  a  few  and  recent  empirical  studies  that 
investigate the connections between production subsidies and exports, we then use large 
firm level datasets and matching procedures (e.g., Gorg et al. 2008, for Irish firms; Girma 
et al. 2009a, for German firms). The motivation is to present evidence of the links between 
production-related subsidies granted to Portuguese firms and their exports performance. 
We use the most representative panel data available for manufacturing firms in Portugal 
for the period 1996-2003 and we apply a propensity score matching approach to uncover 
the nexus of causality between subsidies and exports. 
Thus, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model and an empirical analysis, 
based on Portuguese firms, in order to better analyze the relationships between subsidies 
and exports. The theoretical model is motivated by the fact that (i) full data on public 
subsidies  designed  to  help  exporting  is  scarce,  making  it  hard  to  test;  (ii)  there  is  a 
methodological difficulty in such a test since it is impossible to observe firms with and 
without such subsidies and supports; (iii) the complexity may open paths to misuse abuse 
(e.g., Nogués 1989) and even makes it impossible, in practical terms, to control firms’ 
subsidies.  Bearing  in  mind  all  these  facts,  are  public  policies  for  export  promotion 
ineffective or are we methodologically not able to find the proof of this fact? 
In  line  with  previous  empirical  studies  involving  few  other  countries,  empirical 
findings reveal that production subsidies have little impact on the likelihood that domestic 
firms will begin to export. Nevertheless, in line with the predictions of our theoretical 
model, empirical results also show evidence that production subsidies increase the wage 
premium  of  exporters  and  the  relative  dimension  of  internationalized  firms  relative  to 
domestic ones. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 
derives the steady state. Section 4 analyses governmental intervention. Section 5 describes   4
the data used. Section 6 reveals some evidence on subsidies and exports in Portuguese 
firms.  Section  7  shows  econometric  results.  Section  8  extends  the  analysis  of  subsidy 
effects on other firms’ variables. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
2. The theoretical model 
2.1. Product and factor markets 
Each perfectly competitive final good n Î [0, 1] is produced either by the Domestic or the 
Exports sector. The former (latter) uses unskilled (skilled) intensive labour, L (H), and a 
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A > 1 is the exogenous productivity level. In the Schumpeterian tradition, integrals 
denote the aid of intermediate goods: each j quantity, x, is quality-adjusted; the quality 
upgrade  is  q > 1,  and  k  is  the  top  rung  at  t.  The  expressions  with  exponent  a Î ]0, 1[ 
represent the role of labour inputs. An absolute productivity advantage of H over L is 
accounted  for  by  h ³ l = 1.  A  relative  productivity  advantage  of  either  labour  type  is 
captured by the terms n and (1-n), which implies that H is relatively more productive in 
final goods indexed by larger ns, and vice-versa. The optimal choice for the sector at time t 
is reflected in the endogenous threshold final good n , where the switch of production from 
L to H is advantageous. It follows from profit maximisation by producers of final goods, 
profit  maximisation  by  monopolist  firms  of  intermediate  goods  and  full-employment 
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are aggregate quality indexes, evaluating the technological knowledge in each range of 
intermediate goods, and D º QH/QL is the technological-knowledge bias.  n  is small (the 
number of Exports final goods is large) when D is highly biased, H and/or h are large. 
Defining the aggregate output, Y – resources for intermediate-goods production, X, 
R&D, R, or consume, C –,










0 ) ( ln exp ) ( ) ( ) ( , since  1 ) ( ln exp
1
0 = ∫ dn t pn ,  (4) 
where pn(t) is the n price.  n  can be  expressed in terms of L and H final-goods price 
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H .  (5) 
From (5), small  n  implies a small relative H final-goods price: the demand for each 
j Î ]J, 1] is low, which, as will be apparent below, affects R&D direction; thus, labour 
endowments, h and l influence the R&D direction through the price channel. 
As Y is input of j and the government can pay an ad-valorem fraction, sx, of each 
firm’s cost, (1-sx) is the after-subsidy marginal cost. j embodies a costly R&D design 
recovered by protected (patent law) profits for a certain time in the future. Monopolistic 
profit-maximisation price yields 
a -
x s - p
1
1 = , which, with sx < a, is a mark-up on 1, stable over 
t, across j and for all k. Since the leader is the only one legally allowed to produce top 
quality, it uses limit pricing  ) 1 ( x s q p - =  to capture the whole market. 
Y and X (and R) are function of QL and QH. For example, Y is: 
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The price paid per labour unit, wm (m = L, H), is equal to its marginal product. From 





















H .  (7) 
Thus, for example, an increase in h is a static benefit, see (6), which, due to the 
existing complementarity between inputs, falls n , see (2), and increases W, see (7). 
2.2. R&D sector 
R&D outcomes are designs to improve indexes in (3) – e.g., Acemoglu 2009, Ch. 14; in j 
at t, a firm engaged in R&D that uses y(k, j, t) flow of Y upgrades the next quality, k(j, t)+1, 
with instantaneous probability: 
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m = L if 0 < j £ J and m = H if J < j £ 1;  0 ,  
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t j k q , is the learning effect from past R&D; 
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a   is  the  adverse  effect  of  progressive  complexity;  m
–1  is  the  adverse 
market-size effect. 
The R&D incentive for follower firms relies on the expected monopoly profits flow, 
V(k, j, t), which relies on its duration, on the interest rate, r, and on the profits at each t, 
P(k, j, t):
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Under free-entry R&D equilibrium, expected returns are equal to the resources spent, 
                                                 
6 Due to the Arrow effect, leaders do not undertake R&D (e.g., Acemoglu 2009, Ch. 14).   7
  ) , , ( ) 1 ( ) , 1, ( ) , , ( t j k y s t j k V t j k pb r - = + , where:  (11) 
sr is a governmental ad-valorem subsidy to R&D, which can be m-specific. Equilibrium 
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(12) 
pbm is the equilibrium m-specific pb, given r and pm, which is independent from j and 
k since the quality-rung effect in (9) and (8)-(ii) is offset by its effect in (8)-(iii). In line 
with, e.g., Jones (1995), (8)-(iv) offsets the scale effect in (9); computing pbH - pbL, D is 
thus particularly induced by subsidies under the price-channel mechanism. 
2.3. Consumers 
Fixed infinitely-lived households unelastically supply L or H, and choose a consumption 
















subject  to  the  standard  no  Ponzi  games 
condition  and  to  the  budget  constraint  ) ( - ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t T t C - m t w t K t r t K m + = & ,  which  yields  the 
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r > 0 is the subjective discount rate; q > 0 is the relative risk aversion coefficient; K is the 
total asset holdings, with return r, in the form of ownership of leaders (and not in public 
debt owned by individuals, since, according to a simplifying assumption, the government 
budget is always balanced); (ii) T is a lump-sum tax to finance subsidies. 
3. Steady-state equilibrium 
QL and QH must grow at the same rate since (i) Y has constant returns to scale in inputs, (ii) 
Y, X, R and C are multiples of QL and QH, and (iii) in steady-state aggregates grow at the   8
same rate. From (12), 





























1 ; since r is unique, the steady-state 
growth rate,  * g , is thus also unique. Also, from (2) and (5),  ( )
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1 ,  which 
attenuates  the  rate  at  which  D  is  rising.  Thus,  while 
L H Q Q ˆ ˆ > , 
L H Q Q ˆ ˆ -   is  falling  until 
achieving a stable  * g , where  * * ˆ ˆ
L H Q Q = , which, by (15), also implies a stable  * r : 
q
r -
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* * * * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ  ⇒  0 ˆ ˆ ˆ
* * * * = = = = W n p p L H .  (14) 
Hence, by sx,m and sr,m, the government positively affects g
*, by encouraging R&D: 
sx,m boost profits (9) and sr,m decreases the R&D cost, see (11). 
4. Government intervention 
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using the 4th-order Runge-Kutta numerical method and the baseline values in Table 1. 
Table 1. Baseline parameters and labour levels 
Parameter  Value    Parameter  Value    Parameter  Value    Variables  Value 
h  1.05    b  1.60    r  0.02    A  1.50 
a  0.70    z  4.00    sx,m,sr,m  0.00    H  0.68 
Q  3.33    q   1.50    T  0.00    L  1.00 
Note: Values are in line with our assumptions (h > 1, b > 0 and z > 0), Acemoglu (2009) and to 
calibrate  * g  around 2.5% under (Scenario, Sc0) no governmental intervention. 
 
Figures 1a, 1b and 1c compare the baseline steady-state paths of D,  n  and W with 
those arising from a change at t = 0 where: Sc1, sx,H=0.2; Sc2, sr,H=0.2; Sc3, sx,H=0.2 and   9
h=1.55; Sc4, sr,H=0.2 and h=1.55. Thus, in Sc3 and Sc4, we consider that subsidies also 
improve the absolute advantage of high-skilled labour; i.e., the advantage of labour used in 
the exports sector. Table 2 shows initial and final steady states. 
 
Figure 1. Transitional dynamics of: 
1a. D  1b. n  




Subsidies  accentuate  D:  Sc1,  Sc3  and  Sc4  increases  the  size  of  profits  for  the 
producers of j Î ]J, 1], and Sc2 and Sc4 decreases the cost of H-specific R&D. Towards the 
new steady state, such bias increases the supply of H-intermediate goods, thus raising the 
use  of  the  exports  sector,  see  (2),  and  lowering  the  relative  P  price,  see  (5).  P  drops 
continuously towards the steady-state, which implies that D is rising, but at a decreasing 

































improve high-price goods. The effect upon D is stronger through direct R&D subsidy and 
without the level effect induced by h, due to the effect upon P. 
 




Steady-state value under each Scenario, Sc 
Sc1  Sc2  Sc3  Sc4 
D  1.56  2.54  3.33  1.76  2.30 
n   0.49  0.43  0.39  0.43  0.39 
W  1.55  1.98  2.27  2.00  2.29 
 
Competitiveness of the Exports sector is favoured in Sc2 and Sc4; in Sc2 mainly due 
to the path of D and in Sc4 owing to the level effect; the same happens for W, since in Sc2 
and Sc4 the relative demand for H is strongly stimulated. 
 
5. Data 
In empirical terms, production subsidies are a type of financial assistance that firms receive 
from  domestic  authorities  and  the  European  Union  aimed  at  lowering  their  production 
costs  and  prices  of  the  goods  produced  or  even  at  providing  a  proper  payment  for 
productive factors. In accounting terms, they represent assistance in the form transfer of 
resources, in return for past or future compliance under certain conditions related to firm’s 
activities. These production subsidies are not specifically created to promote exports. 
Our data source is the Portuguese National Statistics Institute (INE) balance sheet 
information (IAE).
7 The IAE provides information on firms’ balance sheets,
8 and uses a 
survey  sample  of  all  Portuguese  manufacturing  firms,  from  1996-2003.  We  used  the 
variables  employees,  turnover,  production  subsidies,  imports,  exports,  foreign  capital, 
                                                 
7 According to a Protocol established between the INE and the Faculty of Economics at the University of 
Porto,  the  authors  have  access  to  the  data  under  specific  rules  of  data  confidentiality  protection.  Thus, 
without additional permission of the INE, data are available upon request only to confirm results. 
8 Since 2004, the INE has changed its methodology and works with all Portuguese manufacturing firms, but 
until 2004 the data used is the data available. The INE ensures the representativity of the sample used.   11
capital,  labour  costs,  employees  devoted  to  R&D  activities  and  earnings.  Firms  are 
classified according to their main activity, as identified by INE’s standard codes (CAE) 
that  are  correlated  with  Eurostat  Nace  1.1  taxonomy.  Despite  being  unbalanced,  our 
database contains information for an average of 4,500 firms per year. Tangible fixed assets 
at book value (net of depreciation) are used as proxy for capital. Nominal variables are 
measured  in  1996  Euros  and  are  deflated  by  using  INE’s  2-digit  industry-level  price 
indexes. 
Since we needed a firm-level productivity measure and since it is highly probable 
that profit-maximizing firms immediately adjust their input levels each time they observe 
productivity shocks, productivity and input choices are likely to be correlated and thus 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimation involves problems. Such as done by several 
authors (e.g., Maggioni 2009), TFP is estimated by using the semi-parametric method of 
Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2003).  This  method  recognizes  the  simultaneity  bias  as  firms 
observe the productivity shocks, but econometricians do not. 
Hence, we compute TFP as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function in 
which  the  firm  value  added  is  the  independent  variable,  and  capital,  labour  and 
unobservable  productivity  level  are  the  dependent  ones.  This  method  assumes  that 
intermediate inputs present a monotonic positive relationship with productivity and thus 
could be used as proxies for TFP. Given data availability, we use intermediate inputs as the 
deflated  values  of  “supplies  and  services  consumed  from  thirds”  at  book  value.  We 
estimate a production function for every 2-digit sector separately. 
6. Evidences on exports and subsidies 
Throughout the period 1996-2003, 26% of Portuguese firms received production-related 
subsidies at least for one year (Table 3); of the firms receiving subsidies, 80% were already 
exporters. The status of subsidized firms is highly stable: subsidy support was persistent as   12
31% of all subsidized firms have obtained operating subsidies every year and more than 
half of the firms had subsidies for at least 6 years out of 8 (Table 4). 
 
Table 3 – Production Subsidies in Portuguese firms, 1996-2003 
Firms with subsidies  Firms without subsidies  Total of firms observed 
2,831 (26%)  7,922 (74%)  10,753 (100%) 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Table 4 – Subsidy persistency in Portuguese firms, 1996-2003 
Number of years with subsidy  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1 
% of firms subsidized  31%  9%  9%  10%  10%  12%  9%  10% 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
On average, for that period, subsidies were 1.4% of sales for subsidized firms, but 
there was time heterogeneity (Table 5). Sector heterogeneity was also observed: food and 
beverage and furniture and recycling received the highest amounts of subsidies per sales 
and, in most cases, the highest amounts of subsidies per employee (Appendix A). 
 
Table 5 – Subsidies per year and employee 
Year  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Share of subsidies on sales (%)  1.8%  1.8%  1.4%  1.3%  1.1%  2.2%  0.9%  0.8% 
Subsidy per employee (€)  232  243  280  258  291  178  185  189 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
For Portuguese firms, trade and subsidies are much more concentrated than sales or 
employment, as measured by the Theil index for inequality assessment (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 – Concentration of Portuguese firms’ employees, 
sales, trade and production subsidies (average 1996-2003) 
Variable  Theil Index 
Employees  0.68 
Sales  1.43 
Exports  2.33 
Imports  2.52 
Subsidies  2.35 
Source: Own calculations. 
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For the same period, we linked firm heterogeneity with trade status. In each year, all 
firms  were  classified  into  four  mutually  exclusive  groups:  Non-Traders  (NT),  Only 
Exporters (OE), Only Importers (OI) and Two-Way Traders (TWT). In our database about 
74% of firms are engaged in external trade: the propensity to export (import) was, on 
average, 63% (69%). Between 1996 and 2003, the degree of Portuguese firm’s engagement 
grew: in 1996, TWT represented 45% of firms and, in 2003, they corresponded to 53%. 
There is also clear evidence that the NT and TWT status are highly stable, while the OE 
and OI status are unstable. However, the time persistency of our exporting firms was, on 
average,  3.8  over  8  years  of  our  sample  data-time  lag.  Moreover,  18%  of  firms  were 
exporters  for  every  single  year  of  the  whole  period,  “persistent  exporters”,  while  25% 
exported in only one single year. 
Subsidies and exports are positively related (Table 7). In column 1 and line 1, we use 
as dependent variables a dummy for exporter status in each year and in column 1 and line 
2, a variable for export shares in total sales; each of those variables are regressed upon a 
constant,  a  dummy  for  subsidized  firms,  sector  codes  and  size.  In  column  2  similar 
regressions are performed, but firm fixed effects are added. We perform regressions using 
logit models for export status dummy and fractional logit models for export shares.
9 All 
regression coefficients are positive and statistically significant, even when controlling for 
firm fixed effects and sectoral and time effects. 
Positive coefficients mean that subsidized firms are probably more exporters (first 
line of regressions) and, among exporters, they present a higher share of exports relative to 
total sales (second line of regressions). The consistency of such coefficients is confirmed 
by the fact that, although not reported, such correlation is observable for each and every 
                                                 
9 We use fractional logit models since the share of exports in total sales is a percentage variable with a high 
probability at zero due to the large share of firms with no exports (e.g., Papke and Wooldrige 1996).   14
year between 1996 and 2003. However, those positive coefficients do not mean that there 
is any causal relationship between subsidies and exports. 
 
Table 7 – Subsidies and exports (average 1996-2003) 
 
Independent variable: 
Subsidized firms (dummy) 
Independent variable: 
Subsidized firms (dummy) 
(firms fixed effects) 








Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). 
 
7. Evaluating the effects of subsidies on exports 
To study the causal effects of production-related subsidies upon the probability to export 
and upon export shares of total sales, we use a different methodology, beyond regression 
analysis.  The  positive  relationship  may  be  the  result  of  both  causality  directions:  (i)  a 
production  subsidy  may  help  certain  firms  bear  with  the  fixed  costs  related  to  the 
beginning of exporting or to deal with difficulties in some markers; moreover, subsidies 
have the ability to reduce certain costs for existing exporters, thus inducing an increase in 
the share of exports in total sales; (ii) new exporting firms or firms exporting to some 
destinations may gain the right to collect subsidies that governments use to reward such 
performances. Thus, the causality may run in both directions. 
There are also other firms’ features beyond subsidies and exports that can affect 
both: Girma et al. (2009a) mention as an example the effect of R&D activities. It is also 
crucial  to  consider  that  subsidies  are  not  randomly  given.  They  are  instead  allocated 
following  a  governmental conscious selection.  We can  consider two opposite selection 
methods: (i) one assumes that subsidies are granted conditionally on the observation of   15
certain criteria,
10 such as the export of certain goods, the types of workforce employed, the 
markets achieved, the types of firms or sales from certain regions; (ii) the other selection 
method  assumes  that  subsidies  are  granted  on  the  basis  of  firms’  connectedness  and 
proximity with the government or public officials and related members. 
Despite being opposites, both introduce a selection criterion for subsidized firms, 
thus  requiring  methods  other  than  simple  regression  analysis  to  properly  evaluate  the 
effects of subsidies upon firms’ performance. By assuming that subsidies (whatever form 
they take) are not  randomly  given, one  cannot assess their effects simply by  a simple 
comparison between subsidized and non-subsidized firms. This situation calls for the use 
of matching methods (e.g., Girma et al. 2009a). Indeed, the ideal method would be to 
compare, in a given year, the firm’ performance (e.g., exports) under public subsidy with 
its performance without public subsidy (the counterfactual situation). 
Since the information on the counterfactual situation will never be available, some 
authors (e.g., Heckman et al. 1998), argue that an adequate way to obtain an appropriate 
evaluation on the effects of the subsidies is to build a “control group” of firms that did not 
receive subsidies in that year, but which are as similar as possible to those firms receiving 
subsidies at that moment (the treated ones or starters). 
By using matching techniques, we hope to build consistent counterfactuals to every 
subsidy “starter”, while using a generic non-subsidized firm. The comparison group would 
not allow us to make causal inferences, since the observed differences after subsidies could 
exist previously in a pre-subsidy period and remain after it. Assuming the possibility of 
building such a control group, we would then match every treated with one or some control 
firm (the most similar to the former) and we would thus assume those differences between 
                                                 
10 The complexity of those criteria can create negative effects of subsidies upon firms’ performances as some 
of them feel discouraged from applying for subsides (e.g., Helmers and Trofimenko 2009).   16
future performances to be the result of the treatment (subsidy) that one firm received and 
the other (control) did not. 
We are interested in two complementary approaches: (i) in line with our theoretical 
model, we intend to assess the impact of subsidies upon the probability that non-exporting 
firms  will  begin  to  export;  (ii)  additionally  to  assess  the  effects  of  subsidies  upon  the 
exporting performance of existing exporters. 
To apply such a methodology, we consider for the first case, as the treated group for 
every  year  from  1998  to  2002,  firms  that  in  each  year  fill  the  following  cumulative 
conditions: without subsidies in the two years before, one year before and in the year under 
consideration,  and  never  exported  until  that  year.  For  each  year,  the  control  group  is 
formed by firms that: (i) had no subsidies in 1996-2002; (ii) did not export until the year 
under analysis. Appendix B presents the number of treated and control firms. 
When  studying  the  effects  of  subsidies  on  already  exporters,  we  consider  as  the 
treated group of firms, for every year from 1998 to 2002, the firms that in each year fill the 
following  cumulative  conditions:  without  subsidies  in  the  two  years  before,  one  year 
before and in the year under consideration, and with exports in the previous year. The 
control group is formed by the firms that: (i) have no subsidies in the whole period 1996-
2002; (ii) exported in the previous year. Appendix C presents the number of treated and 
control firms. 
We start by estimating the propensity score, which is performed by using a probit 
regression of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is subsidized (treated) in that year and 0 
otherwise. Such dummy is, as a base model, regressed on several variables lagged by one 
year (to respect the Conditional Independence Assumption). These variables are assumed   17
to be relevant in the selection of firms to be subsidized:
11 number of employees, TFP, 
wages, a dummy for the existence of R&D workforce, a foreign capital dummy, earnings, 
sales and two digit sector dummies. To free up the functional form of the propensity score, 
we also included higher order polynomials and interaction terms. In the search for a higher 
quality  match,  different  specifications  were  used  for  different  years  and  that  option 
revealed to be more adequate than by using just a single specification for all time cohorts 
of treated and control firms. 
When performing these estimations for each year, we observed the importance of the 
covariates for the dependent variables; although with some heterogeneity, we detect some 
regularities as firms’ sector, previous importer status and foreign capital share were most 
often important factors in explaining firms’ probability for receiving subsidies (Appendix 
D). Otherwise, the efficiency level, the presence of R&D within the firm and wages were 
not significant in explaining the probability of a firm to receive subsidies. 
Then, several algorithms could be used to establish the match between treated and 
control firms. We tested, with similar results, the use of two of those weighting schemes: 
kernel  matching  and  nearest  neighbour  matching.  Given  their  better  properties  upon 
variance, we will present results based on the Epanechnikov kernel.
12 
In order to assess the matching quality we implemented a balancing test proposed by 
Becker and Ichino (2002) and a standard T-test for equality of means. Matching quality is 
confirmed:  Appendices  D  and  E  show  the  high  percentage  reduction  in  bias  between 
treated and controls achieved after matching, thus ensuring we chose the right specification 
for propensity score. We also ensure the common support condition, which means that we 
                                                 
11  By  using  general  production  subsidies,  we  consider  as  determinants  for  subsidy  selection  common 
variables mostly used in the previous empirical works (e.g., Girma et al. 2009; Gorg et al. 2008). 
12 We use a bandwidth of 0.001. Results show little sensibility on the weighting regime used or within the 
bandwidth interval.   18
drop subsidy starters which presented in each year a propensity score higher (lower) than 
the maximum (minimum) score for non-subsidized firms. 
Since our purpose is to evaluate the effects of subsidies upon the probability of a 
domestic firms to start exporting and upon the share of exports of already exporting firms, 
we compute the average treatment effect upon the treated (ATT) as follows:
13 (i) for the 
first case, we are interested in the differences between the percentage of export starters (the 
outcome  variable)  among  subsidized  firms  (treated)  and  the  same  percentage  for  non 
treated firms; (ii) for the second case, ATT means the difference in the change of the share 
of  exports  in  total  sales  (the  outcome  in  question)  between  the  treated  firms  (new 
subsidized in each year) and the same outcome for matched non treated firms (firms that 
remain non-subsidized in that year). 
We assess ATT both for t and for the next three  years: t+1, t+2 and t+3. When 
performing  that  second  ATT  we  are  controlling  for  unobservable,  time-invariant 
differences between treated and non-treated firms; thus, we implement a difference-in-
differences  matching  estimator,  as  suggested  by  Blundell  and  Costa  Dias  (2000)  and 
Heckman et al. (1998). Hence, we compare the change in exports’ performance between 
the group of new subsidized and the most similar group of non-subsidized firms. 
Results  for  the  pooled  sample  of  all  years’  causal  effects  of  subsidies  upon  the 
propensity to start to export are reported in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 – Causal effects of subsidies on starting to export, 1998-2002 
  ATT (prob.expt)  ATT (prob.expt+1)  ATT (prob.expt+2)  ATT (prob.expt+3) 












Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing else is mentioned coefficients are significant 
at 1%. 
** means significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ means coefficients are not 
significant. 
                                                 
13 We use psmatch2 command (version 3.0) for Stata 10.1.   19
 
In this empirical analysis the time span used is too short when compared with the 
period of transitional dynamics observed in section 4; such difference must be taken into 
account  when  comparing  the  two  types  of  results  obtained  by  subsidies.  we  find  no 
evidence of the effect of subsidies to enhance internationalization. Indeed, there is some 
evidence suggesting that subsidies could even imply a drop in firms’ exports probability, 
mainly one year after the subsidy is received.
14 The poor effects of subsidies may result 
from the fact that they were improperly designed to specifically enhance exportsAt the 
other level, results for the causal effects of subsidies upon the share of exports in total sales 
are reported in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 – Causal effects of subsidies on export shares, 1998-2002 
  ATT (Exp Sharet)  ATT (Exp Sharet+1)  ATT (Exp Sharet+2)  ATT (Exp Sharet+3) 












Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: see Table 8. 
 
There is no evidence that subsidies increase the share of exports in total sales, for the 
year subsidies start and for the next three years. In a complementary analysis and since 
subsidies present a relevant heterogeneity in values per employee, average levels by year 
(Table 5) and average levels by industry (Appendix A), it would be interesting to carry out 
an analysis on the  effects of subsidies by  also  using a continuous treatment approach, 
varying between zero and a certain maximum level. However, the use of a generalized 
propensity score is hampered by the highly skewed subsidies’ distribution per employee 
and even by the dominant share of non-subsidized firms. 
                                                 
14 Although not reported, we have also tested similar effects for each of the single years of the sample, but no 
effects are observed.   20
To study the impact of subsidy levels upon the causality nexus with the probability 
of exporting and with the share of exports in total sales, we repeated all previous tests but 
with disaggregating the data: at one hand, we added an additional condition to treated firms 
– treated firms have to receive, in each year, a subsidy per employee higher than the double 
of each year’s average subsidy per employee – to evaluate only highly subsidized firms 
and not all subsidized firms. This computation meant a reduction in treated firms by an 
average of 40%. The results of such causality effects of high subsidies upon the usual two 
dependent variables are expressed in Table 10, but no effects effects were detected. 
 
Table 10 – Causal effects of high subsidies p.e., 1998-2002 
  ATT (prob.expt)  ATT (prob.expt+1)  ATT (prob.expt+2)  ATT (prob.expt+3) 
























Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: see Table 8. 
 
At other hand, to take advantage of a sector analysis for the whole period 1998-2002, 
we performed a separate ATT for each of the available 23 two-digit industries. Concerning 
the probability of starting to export for domestic firms, the number of observations per 
sector did not allow us to carry out the analysis to all sectors.
15 However, we detected that 
the probability of domestic firms to become exporters was in fact increased for sectors 
related with the machinery cluster and involving all types of machines (electrical type, 
office type, motor vehicles and general machinery). Reversely, for the food and beverage 
sector, the subsidies even reduced the probability of domestic firms becoming exporters. 
For all other sectors, no evidence of any kind of effects was observed. 
                                                 
15 Given the small number of observations, we decided not to present the results in the form of table.   21
Concerning the change in export shares of already exporting firms, the available data 
allowed us to perform separate ATT computations for the majority of two digit industries. 
Results (in Appendix E) show that: (i) there are positive effects of subsidies upon export 
shares for basic metals, general machinery and electrical machinery; (ii) some sectors show 
negative effects of subsidies upon the share of exports in total sales (food and beverages, 
textiles, pulp and paper, fabricated metal products). However, given the dimension of our 
sample for most groups, extra precaution is needed regarding general conclusions. 
Complementarily, we have also performed two more tests: (i) firstly, we divided 
firms in two groups based on the initial TFP level; we observed, for firms with higher TFP 
levels, that subsidies generated a positive impact upon export shares, while for other firms 
there was no effect. Thus, we argue that subsidies have higher ability to cause positive 
effects upon exports when firms possess a superior absorptive ability (Table 11); (ii) in the 
second test, we assessed the effects of subsidies, conditional to the initial earnings level 
(Table 12), suggests that grants generate negative effects upon the probability for exporting 
of firms with positive earnings (in the first two years after subsidies are granted), while in 
firms with negative earnings no positive effects are detected. 
 
Table 11 – Causal effects of subsidies on the probability of exporting (segmented analysis: TFP 
levels), 1998-2002 































Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: see Table 8. 
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Table 12 – Causal effects of subsidies on the probability of exporting (segmented analysis: 
earnings), 1998-2002 




























Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: see Table 8. 
 
8. Assessing the effects of subsidies on general firm performances 
Production  subsidies  in our  database  are  not  specifically  oriented  to  enhancing  export. 
They are, in general, dedicated to promoting employment, to support specific industries 
(eventually in some regions) and to help specific firms in difficulties. Hence, it would be of 
great interest to analyze their impact on general firm performances. 
According  to  the  European  Union  Treaty,  any  sort  of  State  aid  to  firms  have  in 
common the fact that they are granted by a member State or through State resources and 
that they favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, but they may also 
distort or threaten to distort competition, affecting trade between member States. Thus, 
state interventions could be needed to reach a better allocation of resources, but they may 
also harm the competition environment with negative consequences. 
In this framework the consequences of subsidies to firms could be either positive or 
negative and previous studies are not sufficiently decisive: for example, Bergström (1998) 
and  Skuras et al. (2004) found that subsidized investments under regional development 
frameworks (structural fund programs) were ineffective. 
Gadd et al. (2009) present a summary on previous studies: (i) some positive effects 
on  employment  and  on  the  dynamics  of  turnover  and  employment  are  reported  for 
subsidized firms; (ii) negative effects on productivity growth rates are also observed in 
subsidized firms. Using a propensity score matching approach, the study of Gadd et al.   23
(2009) for Swedish firms, concluded that subsidies enhanced employment growth levels of 
subsidized firms, but there was no positive effect on firms’ productivity. 
Using our database for Portuguese manufacturing firms, we performed other ATT 
computations  to  assess  the  effect  of  subsidies  on  other  variables:  wages,  sales,  R&D 
employment, employment, TFP and imports. Table 13 presents the effects of subsidies on 
domestic firms and Table 14 presents the same effects, but on already exporters. 
The  general  conclusion  is  that  subsidies  generate  more  positive  effects  on  firms 
already dedicated to exports and fewer effects on domestic firms. Such positive effects are 
observed in exporters’ employment, sales, efficiency (TFP) and R&D employment. For 
domestic firms, subsidies seem to “decrease” relative wages of newly subsidized firms, to 
increase firms’ ability to import and also to improve firms’s R&D ability. 
When  comparing  domestic  firms  and  firms  dedicated  to  exports,  we  notice  that 
subsidies seem to produce an increase in the wage premium in favour of exporters (as 
subsidies  generate  wage  decreases  in  domestic  firms  and  no  significative  effects  in 
exporters), which is coherent with our theoretical result. Moreover, there is also an increase 
in exporters’ sales relative to domestic firms, thus meaning that exporters increase their 
market share, which is in accordance with the model´s intuition. Moreover, for both group 
of firms, subsidies seem to reduce firms’ earnings some years after subsidies are granted.
16 
We  argue  that,  for  domestic  firms,  some  subsidies  could  be  used  to  partially 
supporting the costs of some imported materials. Such effects are observed one year after 
subsidies have been granted. However, in spite of such positive effects, it does not produce 
any impact on those firms’ exporting abilities. 
                                                 
16 Given data limitations we could not test this hypothesis any further. Anyway, we can argue that subsidies 
do  harm  firms’  profits  three  years  after  having  been  received  since  the  persistency  of  subsidies  creates 
negative behaviors conducing to less efficiency in some firms.   24
 
Table 13 – Effects of subsidies, pooled 1998-2002, for domestic firms 
 
Wages  Sales  Employees 
R&D 
empl. 





















































































Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: see Table 8. 
 
Overall, effects (positive and negative) seem to be more robust for domestic firms 
than  for  already  exporters.  Such  superior  strength  of  subsidies’  effects  also  seems  to 
perform more clearly in the year after subsidy reception than in the same year it occurs. 
 
Table 14 – Effects of subsidies, pooled 1998-2002, for firms initially already exporters 
  Wages  Sales  Employees 
R&D 
empl. 



















































































Source: Own calculations. 
Notes: see Table 8. 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
The main purpose of this paper is to theoretically and empirically discuss the the effects of 
public  policies  for  promoting  exports.  This  discussion  has  not  been  dealt  with  by  the 
literature on international trade or by the widespread literature on wage inequality. That is 
why  we  developed  a  dynamic  general-equilibrium  growth  model  with  two  sectors:  the 
exports sector and the domestic sector. Growth is driven by Schumpeterian-R&D applied   25
to quality-adjusted intermediate goods that complement labour. It is assumed that R&D 
directed towards the exports sector is encouraged by public policies, and we analyse the 
effects  of  a  government  intervention  through  an  increase  in  public  policies  promoting 
R&D. 
Despite the complexity added to the production side of our economy, we reach a 
solution that delivers a unique and stable steady-state general equilibrium. We then carry 
out  numerical  analyses  to  solve  the  transitional  dynamics  towards  the  steady  state. 
Government  intervention,  which  promotes  R&D  in  the  exports  sector,  intensifies  the 
technological-knowledge bias in favour of the exports side, which causes an increase in: (i) 
the  competitiveness  of  the  exports  side;  (ii)  the  wage  premium  in  favour  of  exports 
workers; (iii) the economic growth rate. Consequently, at least temporary increases in taxes 
seem to arise as a valid argument to finance public policies promoting R&D. 
Then,  we  empirically  study  for  the  very  first  time  for  Portuguese  firms  the  link 
between production subsidies and exports. Although they are positively related, the link 
between  these  variables  may  suffer  from  endogeneity  and  sample  selection.  To  really 
uncover their relationship, we apply a propensity score matching approach to reveal the 
causal effects of subsidies upon exports.  
In  line  with  most  of  the  theoretical  predictions  our  empirical  results  found  that 
subsidies:  increase  the  wage  premium  of  firms  already  dedicated  to  exports  and  also 
increase the relative weight of exports when compared with domestic sales. Moreover, we 
also found a rise in the importance of R&D variable for both sectors, even if no increase in 
the technological- knowledge bias was empirically proved. Such fact could again suggest 
the misuse of the distribution of production subsidies in Portuguese manufacturing firms. 
At another level, our empirical results also showed that: (i) subsidies received by 
domestic firms had few impact upon their capacity to become exporters; (ii) granted to   26
existing  exports  firms  show  no  significant  effects  upon  their  exporting  performances. 
Nevertheless, we also found some evidence that for some specific sectors and cohorts,  















15  Food, beverages   3.1  2870 
17  Textiles  0.6  250 
18  Wearing apparel  1.1  263 
19  Leather  0.6  223 
20  Wood  0.7  338 
21  Pulp and paper  0.3  280 
22  Printing  2.2  652 
24  Chemicals  0.6  567 
25  Rubber, plastic  0.4  285 
26  Non-metalic mineral product  0.8  307 
27  Basic metals  0.3  191 
28  Fabricated metal products  0.5  230 
29  Machinery  0.6  256 
30  Office machinery and computers  0.7  585 
31  Electrical machinery  0.3  223 
32  TV and communication equipment  0.5  330 
33  Medical, precision and optical instruments  0.8  438 
34  Motor vehicles  0.9  390 
35  Other transport equipment  1.2  802 
36  Furniture  4.4  302 
37  Recycling  11.2  3204 
  Average  1.4  891 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Appendix B – Treated and control firms for matching (starting to export) 
  Treated  Control 
1998  22  160 
1999  17  261 
2000  14  172 
2001  11  125 
2002  15  114 
Source: Own calculations. 




Appendix C – Treated and control firms for matching 
(Export share) 
  Treated  Control 
1998  108  478 
1999  132  491 
2000  78  478 
2001  75  482 
2002  78  483 
Source: Own calculations. 





Appendix D – Important variables in the probability of receiving subsidies 
Years  Variables 
1998  R&D (+), Imports (+), 
1999  Imports (+), forcap (+) 
2000  Sectoral dummies; 
2001  Sectoral dummies; Imports (+) 
2002  Sectoral dummies; forcap 
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Appendix E – Causal effects of subsidies on export shares, 1998-2002 
Sector 




15  Food, beverages   0.002
+  -0.134
* 
17  Textiles  0.264
+  -0.178
* 
18  Wearing apparel  -0.469
+  -0.078
+ 
19  Leather  -0.103
+  0.249
+ 
20  Wood  -0.079
+  0.275
+ 
21  Pulp and paper  -0.338
*  -0.053
** 
22  Printing  0.029
+  -0.005
+ 
24  Chemicals  -0.082
+  -0.053
+ 
25  Rubber, plastic  -0.782
+  -0.806
+ 
26  Non-metalic mineral product  0.151
+  -0.094
+ 
27  Basic metals  0.147
+  0.211
* 
28  Fabricated metal products  -2.145
*  -2.219
* 
29  Machinery  -0.262
+  0.652
+ 
30  Office machinery and computers  n.a.  n.a. 
31  Electrical machinery  0.902
*  -0.153
+ 
32  TV, communication equipment  -0.015
+  -0,152
+ 
33  Medical, precision, optical instruments  -0.015
+  -0,152
+ 
34  Motor vehicles  -7.841
+  -10.12
+ 
35  Other transport equipment  n.a.  n.a. 
36  Furniture  -1.65
+  0.082
+ 
37  Recycling  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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